Dominant parties play a central role in ensuring the stability of competitive authoritarian regimes. Often, the party exercises tight control over the electoral process to ensure that the designated electorate (selectorate) is favorable to its interests. The weakening of this control has been shown to embolden the opposition. Yet, we argue that the weakening of the dominant party’s electoral control—often achieved by granting opposition politicians or external observers a role in election administration—can also, perhaps surprisingly, empower the authoritarian incumbent. This countervailing electoral oversight reduces the incumbent’s dependence on traditional power-brokers within his own party, allowing him greater freedom to forge new alliances that better reflect his policy preferences or political objectives. We examine this argument using the case of Peru. Employing a natural experiment, we demonstrate that the weakening of the Civil Party’s monopoly over the National Electoral Board not only empowered the opposition but also strengthened President Augusto Leguía (1908–1912) vis-à-vis his own party. In areas where the Civil Party relaxed electoral control, the party’s vote-rigging machinery experienced greater turnover, and new legislators were elected who were more aligned with Leguía than the traditional wing of his party. We further show that these areas were more likely to be aligned with Leguía against the Civil Party when he again stood for election in 1919. Our argument has important implications for how authoritarian leaders can maintain authority by circumventing the dominant parties that brought them to power.
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